The Economist has an interesting article this week on the difficulties that China’s North-Eastern region is going through:

http://www.economist.com/news/china/21637449-after-promising-signs-renaissance-chinas-old-rustbelt-suffers-big-setback-back-cold

It can surely be no coincidence that this region borders on North Korea, and shows up some of the economic costs associated with China’s continuing support of that regime.

Quite apart from questions of human rights or other soft power aspects which are diminished by China’s support to the DPRK, the fact that North Korea is and will remain a country shunned by the rest of the world bears real economic and social costs for China itself.

As a thought experiment, imagine that Korea was a single, unified country run from Seoul, instead of being a divided peninsula. China’s North-Eastern region would have a much easier route for import and export of goods through rail links and then ports on Korea’s East coast. In addition, Korean investment would naturally flow to that region, bringing jobs and economic renewal. This might well also benefit China politically, as the triumvirate of China, Korea and Japan would be better balanced. Tensions between China and Japan (And thus Japan’s ally America), would benefit from a single Korea pursuing its legitimate interests. South Korea, while an American ally itself, does not see eye to eye with Japan on a range of issues. China might not feel quite so “encircled” if it observes its neighbors engaging politically with each other on natural and normal questions of economics and diplomacy.

As long as North Korea exists, however, South Korea will remain far more concerned in its calculations with whatever is happening in the North to the exclusion of pursuing other interests. Were the North to be absorbed by the South, not only would diplomatic calculi change between Japan and China, probably lessening the chances of a dualistic tug of war between them, there would also be an enormous boon for China’s North East in providing labor and machinery to help rebuild the former DPRK. Japan too, with considerable construction capital and expertise, might do very well out of such a reconstruction.

However, China’s continuing support of the Kim regime instead ensures that the natural economic development of the region, and any possible boom in investment and reconstruction of the former North Korea, remains stymied. Instead of showing some kind of Chinese strength, their support of North Korea shows a deep-rooted fear. Fear of “encirclement” by economic and political rivals, and fear of change itself. This deep-rooted fear apparently trumps the costs in terms of development and social stability within China itself.

There are seldom clear-cut examples of self-inflicted, internal, economic and social damage caused by purely political concerns. Unfortunately, the case of China’s North-East economic problems, caused at least partially by its bloody-minded support of North Korea, come what may, is one.